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"Liberty must be limited in order to be possessed" 
Edmund Burke, 1777. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION: 
Mental Health law performs two main functions: protecting society from the mentally ill, 
and protecting the mentally ill from the exercise of excessive power by the state against 
them. This paper shall refer to the former as utilitarianism, and the latter as the protection 
of individual rights. There have been significant changes in mental health legislation in 
New Zealand in recent years, and it is the purpose of this paper to enquire whether these 
reforms have managed to properly balance the competing needs of utilitarianism and 
individual rights. The main focus of this paper shall be the Mental Health (Compulsory 
Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, particularly the revised definition of 'mental 
disorder' ,2 patients' rights,3 and rights ofreview which, in the view of the writer, 
comprise the most fundamental and important changes in mental health law. 
Word Count 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography) comprises 
approximately 15,000 words. 
1 Edmund Burke: Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, April 3, 1777. 
2 Section 2 of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. 
3 Part VI of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. 
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II. UTILITARIANISM VS. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: 
Utilitarianism encompasses many different theories, a comprehensive examination of 
which are outside the scope of this paper. In brief, however, all theories of utilitarianism 
require the maximisation of an important value in society. The classic utilitarian theories 
of Jeremy Bentham,4 J.S.Mill,5 and Henry Sidgwick6 took as the fundamental basis of 
morality the requirement that overall happiness should be maximised. Later theories have 
replaced the requirement that "happiness" be maximised with other values, for example 
social welfare. 
At a practical level, utilitarianism is a major focus of mental health law. Legislation is 
enacted to prevent mentally ill people interfering with the liberties of others in society. 
Historically, this was reflected in the institutionalising of mentally ill people - an out of 
sight, out of mind response - inmates in asylums were often incarcerated for very long 
periods of time, and as such were unable to interfere with the everyday lives of the rest of 
society thus maximising the total sum of happiness (welfare) of society at the expense of 
a few individuals. 7 Even though modem methods of psychiatric care are far less 
draconian, there is still a heavy emphasis in the legislation on the protection of society. 
8 
Utilitarian theories have been criticised for favouring the rights, or "happiness", of the 
masses at the expense of the individual, or as Rawls said, utilitarianism "ignores the 
distinctness of persons" .9 For example, a utilitarian would countenance slavery provided 
that the happiness accruing to the slave owner was greater than the pain suffered by the 
4 Jeremy Bentham: An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1879). 
5 J.S.Mill: Utilitarianism (Dent, London 1910). 
6 Henry Sidgwick: The Methods of Ethics (Macmillan, London, 1890). 
7 Wily & Stallworthy: Mental Abnormality and the Law (NM Peryer Lt., Christchurch, 1962) 
8. 
8 See for example s.2 of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 
which purports to protect society from people who are "dangerous". 
9 John Rawls: A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, 1972). 
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slaves. 10 Proponents of individual rights find this suggestion abhorrent because the pain 
and the pleasure accrue to different people. 
A person going to the dentist to have a painful tooth extracted is in a position to weigh 
the pain of having the tooth removed against the "happiness" of being without toothache. 
She can make a decision according to the utility of the situation because both the pleasure 
and pain will accrue to that individual patient. 11 The utilitarian may not make such a 
calculation with regard to the slave owner as it is the slave owner who receives benefit at 
the expense of the slaves. Thus it could be said that mental health legislation should 
embrace the individual rights of mentally ill people as its central purpose, and protect the 
autonomy of the mentally ill from abuses of power by society in the exercise of its 
(utilitarian) right to be protected from harm. 
Do the rights of society and the individual necessarily conflict? The writer suggests not. 
Even an examination of a classic utilitarian theory shows that a desire for general welfare 
maximisation can co-exist with a desire to protect the rights of the individual. J.S. Mill, a 
proponent of classic utilitarianism, developed a theory which embodied both respect for 
the individual and recognition of the need for society's protection: 
"[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member 
of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own 
good, either physical or moral is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be 
compelled to do or forbear because it will make him happier, because, in the 
opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right... To justify that, the 
conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to 
10 N.E.Simmonds: Central Issues in Jurisprudence: Justice, Law and Rights (Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, 1986) 39. 
11 Simmonds, fn 10, 40. 
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someone else. The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to 
society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, 
his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, 
the individual is sovereign." 12 
The essence of this passage is that the only reason which will ever justify interfering with 
liberty is to prevent interference with the liberty of another. 13 Thus, according to Mill, 
the only time one could ever justify the compulsory treatment of the mentally ill to 
maximise social protection would be when failure to treat in this manner would result in 
the infringement of the liberty of another person. 
As an advocate of individual rights, Rawls in his first principle of justice attempted to 
balance the individual's rights against the rights of society. This principle states that: 
"Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty 
compatible with a similar liberty for others." 14 
Whilst this statement may seem essentially similar to Mill's utilitarian statement (above), 
it is less stringent because it is as much concerned with equality as it is with liberty. 
Rawls is not, as it would prima facie appear, concerned with protecting liberty in general, 
but certain specific liberties, for example freedom from arbitrary arrest and freedom of 
speech. 15 The liberties which Rawls selects as being protected by the first principle are 
those which would be chosen by hypothetical persons (the original actors) acting behind 
12 John Stuart Mill: On Liberty (Penguin Classics, London, 1985). 
13 Mill was, in this passage, specifically referring to the criminal law, but the principles apply 
equally well to mental health law. 
14 Rawls, fn 9, 60. 
15 Simmonds, fn 10, 49. 
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the "veil of ignorance". These fictitious people have their identities, social and economic 
positions, knowledge of their natural talents and abilities and knowledge of their 
individual views and preferences stripped from them, and are asked to come up with a set 
of principles which will govern the conduct of society. As these people do not know 
what place they will occupy in that society, they will select rules in accordance with the 
first principle - they will try to maximise the amount of liberty that each person 
possesses. 16 
It is possible that different rules will be chosen by the "original actors" in Rawls' theory 
as opposed to the rules which Mill might suggest. For example, it is possible that the 
original actors might accept the idea that mentally ill people should be compulsorily 
treated for their own good if there was a good prospect of recovery. Mill, however, would 
reject this as infringing the individual liberty of that person, unless, perhaps, non-
recovery would impinge on the liberty of other members of society. 17Thus it can be seen 
that although utilitarianism and individual rights theories have divergent focuses, it is 
possible to balance -- to a greater or lesser extent -- the theories' main concerns. It may 
indeed be surprising that Mill as a utilitarian would reject incursions on individual liberty 
for a patient's own good, whereas Rawls, a proponent of individual rights, might accept 
such an incursion. These are just examples of the many jurisprudential theories in this 
area, given to illustrate the fact that it will be virtually impossible to satisfy the 
competing aims of all theories. However, the writer considers that there is a middle 
ground where an acceptable level of social good (utilitarian aim) can be achieved whilst 
preserving individual rights. It is a delicate balance, and may involve weighing a plethora 
16 Rawls, fn9, 11. 
17 It is possible to argue, however, that Mill would accept compulsory treatment for people who 
are truly incapacitated, i.e. those who are so mentally ill as to be unable to consent to treatment 
in a meaningful way. 
5 
of complexities. For example, both proponents of individual rights and most utilitarians18 
would accept that the rights of the individual should be maximised until they threaten to 
harm society. And conversely, society should be protected so long as individual rights are 
not affected. There are times, however, when it will not be possible to secure both of 
these ideals, and a balancing of interests must take place in the penumbra between these 
two largely uncontroversial poles of agreement. Considerations which must be taken into 
account when weighing the competing rights to social protection and individual autonomy 
will include, for example, the degree of impingement on individual rights/autonomy, the 
nature and gravity of the threat to society, and the imminence of the threat. 19 
The remainder of this paper shall focus on the mental health law in New Zealand, in 
particular the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, 
hereafter referred to as the "Act", and shall examine whether this Act has achieved an 
appropriate balance between the needs of the individual and the needs of society. 
III. IDSTORYOFMENTALHEALTHLAW: 
There has been a dramatic shift in recent years from viewing the mentally disordered as 
quasi-criminals who required incarceration to protect the public, to a sense that the 
mentally ill may on occasion require compulsory treatment as much for their own sake as 
for the protection of others.20 New Zealand's original mental health laws were, as in most 
Commonwealth countries, imported from England. This, in turn, can be traced back to the 
Statute de Prerogitiva Regis which is undated, and suspected to originate anywhere 
18 For example, Rawls. 
19 See, for example, part V.C of this paper. 
20 The shift has been from a rigid utilitarian "protection of society" focus to a more rights 
focused regime which emphasizes rights to treatment and rights whilst being treated. 
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between 1275 and 1339.
21 This enactment deals with the lands of idiots and the lands of 
lunatics which were to be administered on their behalf by the King. This worked ve
ry 
harshly in effect, because even though financial allowance was made for the idiot or 
lunatic, no such provision was made for his or her family. Little was done to help tr
eat 
the insane or even to lessen their distress. In later years, under the Poor Laws, hous
es 
were established where the mentally subnormal could be taken, but in many cases, t
hey 
were just chained to the wall and kept in appalling conditions.
22 It wasn't until the end of 
the 18th Century when advances in medicine caused private hospitals to be formed 
where 
the mentally ill could be more appropriately cared for. This culminated in the passing of 
the Lunacy Act 1890 which was a first attempt at more liberal mental health legislat
ion. 
However, despite the fact that the mentally ill were receiving better attention, the 
derogatory terms such as lunatic, idiot and asylum used in society and in the legislat
ion, 
demonstrate how the mentally ill were perceived. This began to change in New Zealand at 
the beginning of the 20th Century when the Lunacy Act 1908 was replaced by the 
Mental Defectives' Act 1911 which in turn was more suitably renamed the Mental H
ealth 
Act 1954.23 
A new Mental Health Act came into force in 1969 (MHA 1969). The focus of the A
ct 
remained keeping the mentally ill out of society rather than treating them and helpin
g 
them to lead normal lives in the community. The Act was characterised by a massiv
e 
imbalance of power: the hospital staff, administration and the police with the law at
 their 
disposal versus the patient who could be detained, subdued with medication and wh
o had 
very little legal recourse.
24 Under the Act, medical staff could provide whatever treatment 
21 Wily and Stallworthy, fn 7, 14. 
22 Wily and Stallworthy, fn 7, 17. 
23 Wily and Stallworthy, fn 7, 17. 
24 John Dawson: "Mental Health Law Reform" [1986] NZLJ 323, 323. 
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they deemed necessary, without the consent of the patient, or even any at
tempt to 
determine whether the patient was competent to consent. Patients had no 
rights to their 
medical records, and furthermore, they had no right to legal information or 
legal 
representation, and in practice were not even represented at committal hear
ings. 
Additionally, s.124 MHA1969 proved a huge bar to bringing actions again
st employees 
of the mental health system, as it said that special permission had to be ob
tained from the 
High Court before any action could be brought against any person acting "
in pursuance or 
intended pursuance of the Mental Health Act". Additionally, any action b
rought under 
this section was subject to a six month limitation period, as opposed to the
 normal six 
year period. Thus s.124 effectively prevented any successful action being
 brought by a 
psychiatric patient, and allowed the psychiatric profession to continue to 
operate behind 
closed doors. Indeed, the only accountability of mental health professional
 was to other 
doctors under the complaints procedure in the Medical Practitioners Act, a
nd as John 
Dawson asks, " [ w ]hat psychiatric patient would have any confidence in co
mplaining 
about a grievance to another group of doctors in a closed proceedings?"
25 
The 1969 Act was severely criticised by commentators as failing to recogn
ise -- let alone 
protect -- the rights of the mentally ill, with too much emphasis on psychiatric exper
tise 
and with too little accountability. The process of law reform was kindled b
y the Gallen 
Report after the death of a patient in Oakley Hospital who had been give e
lectro-
convulsive treatment (ECT) without anaesthetic, muscle relaxant or even a
ny attempt to 
explain the procedure to him. 
26 The report highlighted serious breaches of procedure, but 
additionally stressed that there were "no adequate safeguards" for patients
 to complain of 
25 Dawson, fn 24, 324. 
26 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Procedures at Oakley Hospital an
d Related Matters 
(Government Printer, Wellington, 1983). 
ill-treatment.
27 The Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 
("MHCAT") has been hailed by many as redressing a significant number of 
the 
shortcomings of the previous Act. 
This paper shall now examine the MHCAT in detail and shall ask whether th
e Act really 
has embraced individual rights. Enquiry shall be made of the balance struck b
y the Act: 
whether the scales have moved towards respect for the individual whilst still
 maintaining 
a sufficient degree of social protection to satisfy utilitarian requirements. 
IV. SHIFT IN FOCUS: FROM DETENTION TO TREA1MENf 
The long title of the MHCAT gives clear indication of the purpose of the Ac
t: 
"AN ACT to redefine the circumstances in which and the conditions under w
hich 
persons may be subject to compulsory psychiatric assessment and treatmen
t, to 
define the rights of such persons and to provide better protection for those 
rights ... " 
Many commentators have welcomed this Act as a significant change in menta
l health law 
recognising that the mentally ill have a right to proper treatment and recognit
ion of their 
fundamental human rights just as society has the expectation that it will be p
rotected 
from dangerous patients who are mentally ill.
28 
v Gallen Report, fn 26, para 8.1.14. 
28 Sylvia Bell: "Whose Rights are They Anyway? The Rights of The Men
tally Ill, and Why 
they are Important." [1997] 2 Human Rights Law and Practice 232,232. 
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Whereas the MHA 1969 placed emphasis on the need for detention, the emp
hasis in the 
new Act is on consideration of the need for treatment.
29 Indeed, it has been suggested that 
the 1992 Act requires that its coercive powers should not be employed unle
ss treatment 
affords a reasonable prospect of improvement or prevention of deterioration
 of mental 
health. This view is far beyond the scope of the 1969 Act (and arguably eve
n beyond the 
new Act), and that this view can even be contemplated highlights the signific
ant nature of 
the changes made by the new legislation. 
The Act uses the language of rights and purports to make the mental health s
ystem more 
transparent and to enable legal redress for wrongs done to mental patients, b
ut, seven 
years on, whether the Act has worked in practice is questionable. The remain
der of this 
paper shall examine whether the Act really does adequately protect patients'
 rights, and 
whether the balance has slipped too far towards the individual rights approa
ch to the 
exclusion of utilitarian considerations. 
V. "MENfAL DISORDER": 
Fundamental to the 1992 Act is the new definition of "mental disorder" foun
d in s.2 : 
""Mental Disorder" , in relation to any person means an abnormal state of m
ind 
( whether of a continuous or intermittent nature), characterised by delusions,
 or by 
disorders of mood or perception or volition or cognition, of such a degree tha
t it --
( a) Poses a serious danger to the health or safety of that person or of others; 
or 
(b) Seriously diminishes the capacity of that person to take care of himself o
r 
herself;" 
29 Trapsski's Family Law (Brooker and Friend, 1993) Vol III, MHintro.07(2). 
10 
This is both narrower and broader than the definition in MHA1969: 
""Mentally disordered", in relation to any person, means suffering fro
m a 
psychiatric or other disorder whether continuous or episodic, that su
bstantially 
impairs mental health, so that the person belongs to one or more of th
e following 
classes, namely: 
(a) Mentally ill -- that is, requiring care and treatment for a mental illn
ess: 
(b) Mentally infirm -- that is, requiring care and treatment by reason 
of mental 
infirmity arising from age or deterioration of or injury to the brain; 
( c )Mentally subnormal -- that is, suffering from subnormality of intel
ligence as a 
result of arrested or incomplete development of mind:" 
A. The First Limb: 
The 1992 definition may be seen as broader than the 1969 section: in
 the first part of s.2, 
there is a list of various symptoms which encompass a wide range of
 abnormalities. 
Indeed, it would appear that this limb was intended to include all per
sons with a 
diagnosable psychiatric disorder of any kind.
30 That is not to say that a "mental disorder" 
must be a diagnosable mental illness before it will fall under this defin
ition. Rather, this 
definition is a legal one; it takes a phenomenological approach which
 does not pinpoint a 
definite diagnosis, but merely lists observable symptomalogical indic
es which may be 
indicative of mental disturbance in a clinical context. Even though a v
ery large number of 
people will fall under the first limb of the definition, the broad definit
ion and the decision 
by Parliament against diagnostic labelling is sound because "psychiat
ric illness is too 
30 Trapsski's Family Law, fn 29, MH2.13.04. 
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complex and insufficiently concrete to be subjected to ... a rigid analysis. "
31 Thus, even 
though this section will encompass a great many people, such flexibility is ne
eded because 
of the indeterminacy of psychiatric diagnosis. 
It was originally thought that "abnormal" in the first limb added little to the definitio
n of 
mental disorder. However recent developments have shown that the term ma
y prove 
difficult. The term "abnormal" begs the question "in reference to what?" Do
 we 
determine normalcy subjectively, against what is normal for the individual, o
r is it to be 
determined objectively against what is normal for society? Inherent in the ob
jective 
approach is the danger that different or non-conformist behaviour will be bro
ught under 
the Act just because it can be termed "abnormal" in reference to what the ma
jority of 
society construes as "normal". This could have huge impact upon individual
 liberty with 
eccentrics being compulsorily restrained and treated under the Act just becau
se they do 
not rigidly conform to the status quo, and their eccentricity may not necessa
rily stem 
from a disorder of the mind, it may simply be evidence of a creative personal
ity. Such an 
outcome would involve a shift towards utilitarianism at the expense of indivi
dual rights. 
In these circumstances, such a shift is not warranted. Subjecting non-confor
mists to 
mental health legislation may make society more uniform in behaviour, but i
t is at the 
expense of the individual's right to self-determination. 
The objective approach has been adopted, in particular, to bring intellectuall
y disabled 
offenders under the Act. 
32 Intellectually disabled persons do not strictly speaking have an 
"abnormal state of mind", as their state of mind is normal for them. It was argued in 
R v T 
(a mental patient) that intellectual disability was a disorder of cognition and t
herefore an 
31Vernon v Bosley (nol) (1997) 1 All ER 577, 610. 
32 S.Bell and W. Brookbanks: Mental Health Law in New Zealand (Brookers, 
Wellington, 
1998). 
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abnormal state of mind.33 There is an additional problem with the objective approach in 
that any person making a decision as to what is abnormal compared to social norms must 
to an extent rely on what his own perceptions of what those social norms are. This is 
quite unacceptable given the lack of consensus as to what "normality" is, and how little 
official guidance there is on the making of such determinations. It must be remembered 
that bringing people under the auspices of the Act has the result that they may be 
compulsorily deprived of their liberty and subjected to treatment without their consent. 
More stringent guidelines must be implemented if the objective approach is to be used. 
Indeed, the Ministry of Health has recognised that there is a danger in using the objective 
approach and has stated that clinicians should bear in mind both the objective and 
subjective approaches when determining a patient's state of mind. 
34 There is, then, a 
danger that the objective standard could be extended in such a way that it becomes 
oppressive and is used by society as a tool against non-conformists. This, is clearly not 
the intention in the Act, which would seem to be an attempt at more liberal mental health 
legislation, and it can only be hoped that this part of the definition isn't abused for 
purposes of social control. 
That a disorder may be "continuous or intermittent" also gives cause for alarm. It was 
included in the definition because some disorders have periods where the symptoms of 
the disorder are in remission, for example with schizophrenia and bi-polar disorder, there 
may be periods of lucidity, but it may be almost certain that the symptoms will return. It 
is fairly uncontroversial to say that when a person is continuously exhibiting symptoms 
covered by the first limb of the act (and satisfies the second limb) he my be compulsorily 
detained and treated. However, the same is not true when the symptoms are only 
intermittent. It was held in In The Matter ofTthat s.2 did not require the court to focus 
solely on the individual's present state of mind because the current state is necessarily 
33 (1993) 10 FRNZ 195, 203. 
34 Mental Health Services, Ministry of Health: Guidelines to the Mental Health (Compulsory 
Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 (Wellington, June 1997). 
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linked to his psychiatric history. The court found that there was no doubt that the 
applicant would fail to take his medication if released from compulsory status and despite 
the fact that there were no outward signs of a mental disorder, and no tendency towards 
aggression, the Southern Mental Health Tribunal refused to release the patient from 
compulsory status.35 This decision was not followed by the Northern Review Tribunal in 
Re PH who stated that where the symptoms are in remission, whether spontaneous or as 
the result of treatment, the patient is no longer fulfilling the criteria of exhibiting an 
"abnormal state of mind", and therefore must be released. The Act does not permit 
compulsory treatment on the basis that there may be some future deterioration.
36 The 
latter decision seems to be most in keeping with the liberal spirit of the Act, and fits with 
the definition in s.2. For person to be deemed mentally disordered they must exhibit 
certain symptoms. If those symptoms are not present, for example in periods of 
remission, then they do not fit within the definition. 
The writer suggests that even though this strict adherence to the definition may allow 
some people who could benefit from compulsory treatment to slip through the cracks, it 
is to be preferred because there is such a high value at stake -- a person's right to liberty 
and self-determination -- that the most narrow and literal reading of the section should be 
preferred until such a time as there is a clearer legislative intent to the contrary. As Mill 
said, the only reason for interfering with the liberty of a person is when he threatens to 
interfere with the liberty of others.
37 Where it is not clear that a person will interfere with 
the liberty of others, there is insufficient reason to favour a utilitarian approach ignoring 
the consequences for the individual. However, the Ministry of Health's guidelines list 
certain situations in which psychiatric history or a reluctance to continue with medication 
35 [1994] NZFLR 946, 958. 
36 20/12/94, NRT 294/94. 
37 See part II of this paper. 
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will be sufficient to allow a compulsory treatment order (CTO) to be made even if the
 
symptoms are in remission. 
38 Although clarification is to be welcomed, extreme caution 
should be used when ordering a CTO when symptoms are in remission otherwise ther
e is 
a danger that people will be detained because of predicted dangerousness, which not o
nly 
is notoriously difficult to predict, but also goes against the "western legal tradition 
[which] generally mandates the deprivation of liberty only after a crime has been 
committed -- not before. "
39 There is a tension between the need to protect society from 
people who may become dangerous, and the need to protect the autonomy of persons
. 
This tension will be difficult to resolve. The writer has suggested, however, that a narr
ow 
reading of this first limb so that individuals have their autonomy limited only in situat
ions 
where they are in fact "dangerous" rather than supposed to be. In this way, society w
ill 
be protected from the mentally ill when it becomes necessary to intervene, and 
additionally, individual liberty and autonomy is maximised. 
B. The Second Limb: 
The second limb of the 1992 Act is much narrower in scope than any of the provision
s in 
the 1969 Act and as such is able to constrain the definition to those mentally ill peopl
e 
for whom compulsory treatment under the Act is absolutely necessary. The second lim
b 
of s.2 is sometimes referred to as the "severity criteria", and it states that only when a
 
mentally disordered person meets the "severity criteria" may he be brought under the 
Act 
for the purpose of compulsory treatment.
40 Effectively, there are five criteria in the 
second limb: 
(a) serious danger to the health of others, 
(b) serious danger to the health of oneself, 
38 Mental Health Guidelines, fn 34. 
39 Grant Amer: "Mental Disorder: "Serious Danger" - a minor faux pas or a serious m
istake?" 
[1996] MHL 40, 42. 
40 Arner, fn 39, 41. 
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( c) serious danger to others, 
( d) serious danger to oneself, 
( e) seriously diminished capacity for self-care. 
This limb of the test has been the main focus of judicial decisions as it is the
 hardest part 
of the test to satisfy, and in this way, provides a limit to the seemingly open
-ended 
definition in the first limb. The two limbs of the test are conjunctive: not unt
il the first 
limb is satisfied, can the second limb come into play. There has, however, be
en 
considerable dispute as to what this second limb actually means. 
C. Serious Danger: 
The requirement of "dangerousness" in a person is one of the most criticised
 aspects of 
the Act. It has been criticised by some medical practitioners as overly restric
tive, 
preventing them from helping the mentally disordered to the best of their ab
ility. Brent 
Doncliff, the Manager of the Community Mental Health Service in Timaru s
ays: 
"There have been times when I have been working with mentally ill people, s
ome 
of whom have quite severe manifestations of mental illness. As a clinician I s
ee 
that they are in need of what I may have to offer -- but they refuse my help!
 .... 
To me, ifl know that a person's mental state will eventually deteriorate as a 
result 
of their decision to discontinue maintenance of medication, and they lack the
 
insight to be aware of this, then this is a serious danger to their health".
41 
He argues that waiting until a person is "dangerous" and thereby falling unde
r the auspices 
of the Act is unsatisfactory as preventative medication is often more effectiv
e, and is 
certainly more cost-effective than waiting until a person's situation deteriora
tes to such an 
extent that they fall within the definition in s.2. There is also the additional b
enefit that a 
potentially dangerous person is not left in society until they chose to exhibit
 their 
41 Brent Doncliff: "Personal Viewpoint: Mental Health (Compulsory Asse
ssment and 
Treatment) Act 1992: The Decision - Law and Process or care?" [1996] MH
L 7. 
16 
dangerous tendencies. This approach certainly satisfies the utilitarian
 criteria: society's 
safety and welfare is maximised at the expense of individual liberty. 
What this approach 
does not take into account, though, is that the individual is stripped 
of his autonomy 
because he is predicted to be dangerous. As mentioned above, detain
ing a person for 
predicted malfeasance would seem abhorrent in the context of crimin
al law, so why is 
mental health law any different? 
Additionally, "dangerousness" is notoriously difficult to predict. res
earch has 
demonstrated that psychiatrists cannot reliably predict dangerousne
ss.42 Grant Amer 
notes a study conducted in New York State following the case of Br
axstrom v Herolcf
13
. 
Braxstrom was certified insane by a prison doctor and detained in a 
prison hospital 
following the completion of his sentence. He petitioned the court tha
t he should be 
transferred to a psychiatric hospital ifhe was insane, and released if
 he was sane. The US 
Supreme Court released him, and about 1 OOO patients in similar circu
mstances were also 
released. Four years later, only 2.7% of those patients had behaved d
angerously. Those 
who did behave dangerously showed no consistent signs which woul
d have allowed a 
prediction of their dangerousness.
44 Thus it would seem that there is a great danger that 
predicted dangerousness may be used as a reason to deprive a perso
n of their autonomy 
in situations where they would not have behaved dangerously. While
 this clearly upholds 
society's interest in protection, predicted dangerousness alone canno
t be sufficient 
justification for depriving a person of his liberty and subjecting him
 to compulsory 
treatment. 
Initially, it was thought that the term "serious" added little to the req
uirement of 
dangerousness and was just an indication that compulsorily treating 
a person against their 
42 Crawford: "Problems with the Assessment of Dangerousness in 
England and Wales" [1984] 3 
Med & Law 141. 
43 (1986) 383 us 107. 
44 Amer, fn 39, 41. 
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will was not a step to be taken lightly. However the term has been interpret
ed so that it is 
a valuable limitation on the indeterminate and unpredictable term "dangerous
". 
Given that it is so hard for clinicians to predict dangerousness, judges have t
ended to 
interpret "serious" as requiring imminence, thus preventing people being det
ained because 
at some indeterminate time in the future, they may cause harm.
45 Sylvia Bell and Warren 
Brookbank:s recommend that imminence is just one of a number of factors w
hich should 
be taken into account when determining the "seriousness" of the danger pres
ented by a 
mentally disordered person. These factors should include: 
"(1) Level (that is gravity) of the harm should it eventuate; 
(2) Likelihood of the harm occurring; 
(3) Imminence (that is the time-frame) of the harm; 
(4) Frequency of the harm; 
(5) Need to balance the nature of the harm against the proposed intervention
."46 
This is a sensible and practical scheme which would allow the danger presen
ted by an 
individual to be meaningfully assessed, taking into account various relevant c
riteria, rather 
than having to stab in the dark as to what "serious danger" means.
47 Of particular 
importance is the fifth of the suggested criteria. It is this which would require
 a weighing 
of options: the judge would have to ask whether the nature and the imminen
ce of the harm 
to society was to such a degree that it warranted the deprivation of liberty a
nd autonomy 
of an individual. There is no such express requirement in the current Act wh
ich is 
unfortunate given that the balancing of these factors is the very purpose of m
ental health 
legislation. 
The dangerousness criteria has also been criticised because it is not defined i
n the Act. 
Whilst checklists like the one above may be of assistance, because the term i
s of such 
45 See, for example, Re JK [Mental Health] (1994) 12 FRNZ 14; [1994] NZFL
R 679. 
46 Bell and Brookbanks, fn 32, 2.5. 
47 See also WJ Brookbanks and AIF Simpson: "Restricted Patients in New Zealand: A Legal an
d 
Clinical Overview" [1996] 3 Journal of Law and Medicine 336, 361-377. 
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fundamental importance to the Act ( only when the criteria ha
s been satisfied may the 
powers under the Act be invoked) and because a determinatio
n that someone is 
sufficiently dangerous has such severe implications, it is unsa
tisfactory that this term is 
left undefined, or at least unrefined. That a checklists of facto
rs have been used by the 
courts in recent years is to be welcomed, however, this definit
ion is of such fundamental 
importance that the term should have been determined at the 
outset. When the focus of an 
Act is deprivation of liberty and autonomy, certainty should 
be a prerequisite. As has 
already been seen, it is hard enough to determine whether a pe
rson is mentally disordered. 
The level of dangerousness required before he can be compuls
orily treated should be much 
more certain in order to avoid arbitrary results. 
Furthermore, "dangerousness" is not a helpful term because it
 tends to encourage views in 
society that the mentally ill are always dangerous people. Th
is may hamper efforts to 
treat the mentally disordered in the community and may incre
ase the number of mentally 
disordered patients being returned to hospital. Other stigmatis
ing words such as lunatic 
and asylum have been removed from mental health legislation
: "dangerousness" conjures 
images of the mentally ill running wild and committing serious
 crime. In many cases, 
mentally disordered people subject to a CTO will only cause 
"anxiety" and "emotional 
distress to those around them." These minor effects have been
 held by the courts to 
amount to "dangerousness".
48 Thus, it is suggested, "danger" is too stigmatising and 
emotionally charged to enable a proper appraisal of the harm a
 mentally disordered 
person may cause. An alternative definition has been suggeste
d by Amer: 
"A clinically significant treatable behavioural, or biological, or
 psychological syndrome or 
pattern that occurs in an individual, which causes clinically sig
nificant distress or 
disability or impaired judgement, or impairment in social, occ
upational or other important 
areas of functioning. "
49 
48 Amer, fn 39, 41. 
49 Amer, fn 39, 43. 
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The writer suggests that the non-judgemental language i
n this proposed section is to be 
preferred to the "dangerousness" criterion. It provides a
 relatively certain standard, 
because mental impairment must be "clinically significa
nt" and therefore avoids the 
difficulties in predicting when a person will behave "dan
gerously". Additionally, it may 
enhance society's perceptions of the mentally ill, so tha
t such persons are not viewed as 
necessarily "dangerous" but simply as people who suffe
r from diseases of the mind. The 
severity criteria are of the utmost importance as they lim
it the number of people who 
may be compulsorily detained under the Act. If the seve
rity criteria still kept the majority 
of people with sufficiently serious mental disorders out
 of society, it would be possible 
to maximise the welfare of the individual by removing te
rms such as "dangerousness". In 
this way, those who are merely predicted to be "dangero
us" would not be interfered with, 
and respect for the mentally ill may be increased, withou
t prejudicing the utilitarian aim of 
social protection. 
D. Health and Safety: 
The second limb of the definition states that a person ex
hibiting symptoms listed in the 
first limb may be considered mentally disordered if they
 pose a "serious danger to the 
health or safety of that person or of others." There was 
initially some doubt as to 
whether "health" included mental as well as physical he
alth. The courts concluded that 
had parliament wanted to limit the definition to physical
 health alone, some limiting 
wording would have been included. Doogue J found that
 mental, emotional and 
psychological health and well being were included in the
 ordinary meaning of the term, but 
that when dealing with non-physical effects, greater care
 must be taken because of the 
difficulty of assessment. so This holistic approach to health
 means that a person may be 
50 In the Matter of D [1995]NZFLR 28, 45. See also, In the M
atter of T unreported, DC Auckland 
13.2.95. 
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compulsorily treated for a mental disorder when his behaviour results in fear or anxiety or 
. 1 h 51 emot10na stress toot ers. Arguably, "serious danger to health" would also enable a 
person to be subjected to a CTO where their mental disorder adversely affects their 
capacity to care for dependants. This will be of special importance when the mentally 
disordered person is the primary care giver to children. 
52 The writer suggests that if the 
degree of anxiety, distress or stress to others is properly monitored and weighed, and 
people are not compulsorily assessed just because their behaviour is non-conformist, 
"serious danger to health" is a useful and baianced requirement in the Act, and it is 
especially important when the people living with a mentally disordered person are 
children or infirm or elderly persons who have a diminished capacity for self-protection. 
53 
More difficult, though, is the possible committal of a person because her mental disorder 
adversely affects her own mental health. Initially, the court found that "the danger posed 
must be shown as likely to be injurious to other aspects of the patient's physical integrity 
or well being [and not his mental health]"
54 However, a later decision concluded that the 
term also included danger to mental health, and to find otherwise would be to distort the 
legislative intent.55 This argument is circular. A person's mental illness is necessarily a 
danger to their mental health. 
To subject a person to a CTO just because they are mentally ill defeats the purpose of 
the Act which appears to require a level of "dangerousness" -- logically, this must be 
dangerousness over and above the mere presence of a mental disorder. The degree of 
51 Amer, fn 39, 41. 
52 New Zealand Law Society Seminar: The Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and 
Treatment) Act 1992. Leaders: John Dawson, Dr Jeremy Anderson, Stephen McCarthy. 
(Wellington, 1993). 
53 See Decision 354 27/10/95 where the risk that a person posed to her child was considered an 
indicator of continued mental disorder and need for treatment and was taken into account when 
rejecting her application for release from a CTO. 
54 Per Ellis, J: In the Matter of JK (1994) NZFLR 678, 695. 
55 In the Matter of T (1994) NZFLR 946, 957. 
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deterioration which will amount to dangerousness is extremely difficult to assess, and 
there is no guidance in the Act. Indeed, it is not even clear that deterioration to mental 
health was even contemplated by the Act. Jane Hunter draws an analogy: 
"if someone suffered from cancer and chose, on being appraised of their options, 
to refuse treatment, they would not, in law, be forced to submit to treatment, even 
if the ultimate outcome would mean their death. The consequences are serious, 
demonstrable, and potentially imminent. 
1156 
This is an interesting point, and further illustrates the flaws in the argument that 
deterioration of mental health can amount to dangerousness. The writer suggests that this 
does not accord with the phenomenological definition of mental disorder in the Act. 
Section 2 delineates mental disorder by reference to cause and effect -- the cause must be 
certain observable symptoms. It is illogical to allow those symptoms to also count as the 
required effect. In that case, what would be the point of the two stage test? The 
interpretation of "health or safety of that person" adopted by the courts is 
unsatisfactory. It accords too little weight to the requirement that a mental disorder must 
manifest itself as a symptom before the person may be subjected to a CTO. In this way, 
the interpretation does not seem to serve social utility or individual rights. If a person is 
capable of taking care of himself, he does not require detention for his own good, and if 
there is no necessary outward manifestation of dangerousness, then society does not need 
protection, and in that case, the individual is being deprived of liberty arbitrarily. This 
would appear to breach of s.22 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, which 
guarantees protection against arbitrary detention. 
Furthermore, dangerousness to oneself has been taken to include suicidal risk, or risk of 
self mutilation. Accurate assessment of these risks is virtually impossible. The 
assessment is often extremely subjective.
57 Given that there is no reliable way of 
56 Jane Hunter: "Don't Compel Patients Just Because they are Ill." [1996] MHL 57, 58. 
57 Amer, fn 39, 42. 
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determining the risk of suicide, it seems that there are insufficient guidelines for the 
clinician when determining the risk which should bring a person under the Act. 
Additionally, the patient may not currently be displaying symptoms, and therefore will 
not strictly satisfy the definition in s.2 because of a lack of symptoms. Therefore, it is 
suggested that this section requires further legislative clarification, and a set of guidelines 
to determine, for example, how recent the suicide attempt has to be, how effective the 
attempt was ( did he take a few too many aspirin, or a whole bottle of sleeping pills?) and 
whether there is strong evidence of a wish to try again. It is suggested that in the absence 
of recent serious attempts, it is far too difficult to determine whether someone who 
professes to have suicidal intent is really a danger to himself. If in fact there is no 
'danger', society's interest in protection is not being furthered, and there is no 
justification for removing the individual's right to autonomy. 
E. Seriously Diminished Capacity for Self-Care: 
In part (b) of the second limb, it states that a person satisfying the first limb of the test 
may be detained under the Act if a mental disorder "seriously diminishes the capacity of 
that person to take care of himself or herself''. This has been interpreted broadly by the 
tribunals as meaning more than a ability to care for oneself "in the narrow sense of eating 
and washing ... but in the wider sense of managing in the community."
58 
As was noted in the Law Society Seminar, there are two aspects to this part: fustly, 
capacity to take care of themselves, and secondly, the level of self care. 
59 It is crucial that 
this distinction be made else, there is the possibility that people could be detained under 
the Act because of a life-style choice. 
People may have their reasons for refusing medical treatment, eating poorly and choosing 
inferior accommodation, but so long as they are competent to make that decision, the law 
58 Re Decision 274 13/7/94, NRT 274/94. 
59 Law Society Seminar, fn 52, 29. 
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should not interfere. Even more importantly, the law should not intervene and make 
persons subject to a CTO because they are mentally disordered and cannot afford to care 
for themselves in a better manner, because utilitarian goals would not be advanced, and 
there would be a severe incursion into individual liberty. Poverty should not be confused 
with a lack of capacity. The focus should be, and this seems to have been recognised by 
the courts, on capacity to make the decision, not the substance of that decision. 
60 This 
provision does seem to have been interpreted by the courts, on the face of it, in a liberal 
manner. There is, however, danger that this provision may be misused; because it is so 
difficult to determine what part (a) actually means, there may be a temptation to try and 
force cases to fit under this head. This is clearly not desirable as precision is needed when 
deciding whether to commit a person under a CTO, and thus some redefinition in these 
sections would provide greater safeguards for individual liberty, whilst still providing 
adequate protection for society. 
VI. DELUSIONS, DISORDERS OF MOOD, PERCEPTION, 
COGNITION OR VOLITION. 
As stated above, the definition of mental disorder in the first limb of s.2 is intentionally 
broad. The inclusion of delusions and disorders of mood and perception has caused 
relatively little difficulty as they have a recognised and accepted psychological meaning.
61 
Disorders of volition and cognition, however are not precise clinical terms, and thus it has 
been very difficult for lawyers and psychiatrists to agree on a meaning. Clearly, this is 
cause for concern: the Act enables a person to be deprived of his liberty, so it is almost 
unthinkable that the symptoms he may be said to exhibit are not understood in any 
concrete or meaningful way. 
60 See McCormick J, in Re CMC [1995] NZFLR 538, 541. 
61 Bell and Brookbanks, fn 32, 2.8. 
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A. Disorders of Volition: 
In Re A the Northern Review Tribunal said that: 
"as the term 'disorder of volition' has no medical or psychiatric significance it 
should be given its ordinary and natural meaning .... [T]o literally apply the 
dictionary definition of volition which relates to wishing, willing, choosing and 
decision-making would result in the definition of mental disorder embracing an 
inordinately vast range of conditions. On the other hand to apply too narrow a 
definition of the term 'disorder of volition' would militate against the legislative 
intent to bring within the 'mental disorder' definition of conditions demanding of 
compulsory treatment. "62 
The definition of volition is unclear, imprecise and difficult to determine. In the above 
case, the applicant was held to be suffering from a disorder of volition because "to an 
abnormal extent he [failed]to learn to adjust and control his impulsive behaviour." The 
tribunal held that it was unnecessary to enquire whether the applicant's impulsive 
behaviour was involuntary or whether the behaviour was simply an impulse not resisted: 
it was the end result that was important. With respect, this is an alarming decision. 
Subjecting people to CTO's when they cannot control their behaviour is one thing, but 
forcing people to undergo treatment when they have simply made antisocial decisions is 
quite another matter. 
It is possible that a person who has simply given in to an impulse should not fall under 
the definition of "mental disorder" at all, otherwise it would be tantamount to punishing 
people for crimes they might commit. As mentioned above, this is an odious result as it is 
oppressive towards the individual and removes personal responsibility for ones actions. 
The role of the criminal justice system includes the rehabilitation of people who cannot 
62 Re A 1/ 6/ 95, NRT 320/ 95. 
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resist impulses to thieve, commit arson, burglary etc, in addition to advancing the 
utilitarian goal of social protection. The role of the mental health system is to protect 
society and to rehabilitate the mentally disordered. If impulsive behaviour is merely a 
choice, then it is completely inappropriate to subject a person to a CTO because the 
mental health system is unlikely to be able to help them. A distinction must be made 
between people who are "mad" and people who are "bad". 
There is additionally, the thorny problem of whether personality disorders are to be 
considered disorders ofvolition.63 It was suggested that under the 1969 Act persons with 
personality disorders were excluded because they could not be treated or cured. This was 
clarified somewhat in relation to the 1992 Act by a decision of the District Court in 1996: 
Re H. 64 In that case, a patient suffered severe bulimia accompanied by frequent mood 
swings characterised by anger and despair. She frequently tried to eat poisonous or 
otherwise harmful substances and objects and had suicidal tendencies. She often fainted, 
suffered from anaemia and refused all medication, and tended to remove all IV apparatus 
from her body. An application was made for an extension of her CTO. There was some 
argument among the professionals that as the patient's problems couldn't properly be 
characterised as a specific "mental illness" or "mental disorder" the hospital could not 
compulsorily detain her, despite the risk she posed to herself and to others.
65 Judge Inglis 
QC made two distinctions. Firstly, the definition of "mental disorder" is a legal one, not a 
medical one, and as such is dependant on observable symptoms rather than any concrete 
"disorder" as such, and secondly "the expression 'mental disorder' is used simply as a 
63 See C.Elliot: "Puppetmasters and Personality Disorders: Wittgenstein, Mechanism and 
Moral Responsibility"[1994] 1 Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology 91. 
64 Family Ct, Palmerston North, CAT 054 03095, 29 July, 1996. 
65 See WJ Brookbanks: "Defining Personality Disorder" [1996] MHL 87. 
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convenient term to describe a combination of threshold characteristics which must be 
found to exist in a particular patient before that patient can be required to undergo 
compulsory assessment and treatment. 
1166 
Thus, the real question is whether there is an observable abnormality of mind in law. 
Judge Inglis QC said that regarding personality disorders, the wrong questions are being 
asked: it is not necessary that one should be able to say "personality disorders are mental 
disorders", one must instead look to the symptoms of the personality disorder (as with 
all other mental abnormalities) and determine whether those symptoms can be classed a 
disorder of mood, cognition volition or a delusion within the terms of s.2. In Re H, it was 
clear that the patient suffered a severe disorder of mood within the legal definition, and 
additionally suffered from a disorder of volition "in whatever sense that term is to be 
understood" because of her attempts to harm herself, commit suicide, and her inability to 
deal with food. 
This is an extremely important decision: in effect, it establishes that personality disorders 
are not necessarily mental disorders under the Act, but that they may be, providing 
observable symptoms and the requisite "dangerousness" are present. This decision is in 
accordance with the spirit of the Act: that "dangerous" people with certain observable 
symptoms should be made subject to a CTO for the protection of themselves or society. 
It seemingly finds a sensible balance between individual rights and utilitarianism. Had the 
court ruled that personality disorders could not be mental disorders under the Act, 
society would have been put at risk with mentally disordered persons being outside help 
until they committed a crime and could be brought within the criminal justice system. In 
which case, the criminal justice system would be an inappropriate place for a person 
suffering from a mental illness as they would be held wholly responsible for their actions. 
66 Brookbanks, fn 65, 88. See also: D.McCullum: "Law, Psychiatry & Anti-social Personality 
Disorder: A Problem of Government." [1998] Law in context 29. 
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Furthermore, although seemingly paternalistic, helping people for their own good in this 
circumstance is not an unjustified incursion into individual autonomy so long as the 
requisite "severity criteria" and observable symptoms are strictly observed. If people are 
truly incapable of recognising and promoting their own interests, their autonomy is not 
being violated if measures are taken for their own good, so long as their individual rights 
are protected to the maximum possible extent. In such situations, society's need for 
protection is arguably more pressing than the need to rigidly preserve individual 
autonomy at all costs, especially when a person is in no position to exercise that 
autonomy. 
B. Disorders of Cognition: 
Clinically, disorders of cognition are generally associated with organic brain stem 
dysfunction arising from for example, drug related delirium, head injury, severe 
depression, or dementia. Symptoms normally involve disruption of thought processes 
such as memory, judgement, insight and orientation. 
67 
Although intellectual disability has been specifically excluded by s.4 as the sole indicator 
of a mental abnormality, the District Court has held that intellectual disability may fall 
within the definition of" disorc!_er of cognition". It is important to note that to bring an 
intellectually disabled person within the Act, it is necessary that there is some other 
mental abnormality to satisfy the terms of s.2 when read with the exclusionary provision 
in s.4. Thus if an intellectually handicapped person also suffered from disorders of mood 
or disorders of cognition ( over and above his intellectual handicap) then he could be 
brought within the scope of the Act. Whilst it is often asserted that there is no point in 
subjecting an intellectually handicapped person to a CTO as he cannot be treated 
(intellectual handicaps do not generally improve), this is an important provision from the 
point of social utility. If a person displays symptoms which would otherwise determine 
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him as having an abnormality of mind and presents a danger to himself or to society, i
t 
would be illogical for the Act to exclude him by virtue of s.4. For the protection of 
society, and for the protection of the intellectually handicapped, this is an important 
distinction. 
VII. PATIENTS' RIGHTS 
Part VI of the Act contains provisions relating to patients' rights. This is the first 
reference to patients' rights in the New Zealand legislation, and as such, it must be 
welcomed as a step away from archaic mental health laws with emphasis on detention
 and 
social utility towards a more liberal and enlightened philosophy recognising the rights 
and 
autonomy of the individual regardless of their mental state. This Part was influenced to
 a 
large extent by international conventions, most particularly, the International Covenan
t on 
Civil and Political Rights which recognises certain basic, fundamental human rights, su
ch 
as the right to freedom from cruel, inhumane and degrading punishment, freedom from
 
arbitrary detention, and the right to humane treatment and respect for inherent human
 
dignity, and also The United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with 
Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health care. This outlines the stand
ard 
of treatment a person can expect to receive from a mental health system, and reiterates
 
certain fundamental rights. A similar ethos is reflected in the 1992 Act, bringing New 
Zealand's legislation into line with international standards and approaches taken in oth
er 
jurisdictions. 68 
67 Trapsski's Family Law, fn 29, MH2.13.13. 
68 See Zifcak: "United Nations Principles for the Protection of People with Mental
 Illness: 
Applications and Limitations" (1997)20Intemational Journal of Law and Psychol
ogy 259. 
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It must be noted, however, that while part VI of the Act recognises the fundamental 
importance of patients' rights, only one of the rights is mandatory: the right to receive
 in 
writing a statement of one's rights "on becoming a patient".
69 The other rights in this part 
are expressed as entitlements only. One would hope, though, that even the use of the 
language of rights creates an obligation that mental health professionals will take 
seriously, recognising their inherent obligation to treat a patient with the respect accor
ded 
to him by this part of the Act. 
This is an important part of the Act and clearly indicates the shift in focus in New 
Zealand mental health legislation. Provisions creating patients' rights do not generally 
affect the utilitarian goal of social protection, yet such provisions are of immense valu
e to 
individuals as they will increase feelings of self-worth and empowerment. This part of
 the 
Act is central to striking the right balance between utilitarianism and individual rights. 
A. s.64 Written Acknowledgement of Rights: 
As discussed above, this is a mandatory right, but the written acknowledgement needs
 to 
be provided only on a person "becoming a patient". This means that a person may be 
held 
when they may not have even been examined by a specialist in psychiatry and thus m
ay 
not be able to avail themselves of the provisions in part VI. This would be an unfortun
ate 
result of an otherwise helpful section, and to counteract potential problems with 
fundamental rights not being recognised, the Ministry of Health stated in its guidelines
 
that the spirit of part VI of the Act should be taken to apply also to proposed patient
s. 70 
69 Section64. 
70 Mental Health Services, Ministry of Health: Guidelines to Mental Health (Com
pulsory 
Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 (Wellington, June 1997) 31. 
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In many ways, this is a more stringent safeguard to rights than that adopted in other 
jurisdictions, for example under the Mental Health Act 1983 (UK) a patient needs only 
be informed of his rights as "soon as practicable"; such provisions add an element of 
discretion which could erode the strict requirement that patients are informed of their 
rights. 
The right in this section is of special importance because it enables the effective 
functioning of other rights contained in the Act - without knowledge of one's right to 
judicial review, for example, it would be very hard for a patient to launch an appeal 
against his detention. Thus the individual is empowered without jeopardising the social 
good. 
B. s.65 Respect for Cultural Identity: 
This is another important step by the legislature towards recognition of individual rights, 
and shows a sensitivity towards the needs of a multicultural society such as New 
Zealand's. Several reports by committees of inquiry highlighted a lack of sensitivity to 
cultural issues, and this section can be seen as an attempt to recognise the diverse 
attitudes to mental health issues that will be held by society.
71 This section has been used 
to promote connection with family and iwi to promote a patient's well being.
72 
71 See RG Gallen: Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Procedures at Oakley Hospital and 
Related Matters (Government Printer, Wellington, January 1983). 
KH Mason: Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Procedures Used in Relation to Admission, 
Discharge or Release of Certain Classes of Patients (Government Printer, Wellington, August 
1988). 
JA Laurenson QC: Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Death at Carrington Hospital; of
 
a Patient Manihere Watene and Other Related Matters . (Government Printer, Wellington, 
1991). 
72 Re PT 19 /7 /95, SRT 30 /95: a patient was moved to a unit nearer his whanau so that he could 
be better assisted as a maori. 
This section is vitally important, given the disproportionate number of Maori in 
psychiatric care, and the statistical imbalance appears to be increasing. 
73 It can only be 
hoped that an increasing cultural awareness will help redress this balance and give 
appropriate and effective support to minorities. 
One aspect of this provision that has not been tested is the question of culturally 
insensitive treatment.7
4 It was recognised in the Gallen Report that ECT may be 
inappropriate for Maori because of the special significance they place on the head. 
75 It 
may be that the need for cultural sensitivity will override an assessment that ECT, for 
example, would be an appropriate treatment. 
Section 65 is a welcome addition to the 1992 Act. Although its effects have yet to be 
fully explored, it is likely that this provision will have significant and positive impact on 
the right of the individual to have his cultural beliefs respected. Even though the ruling out 
of certain treatments may reduce the likelihood of recovery of a patient and thus may 
effect his behaviour vis a vis society as a whole, this must be outweighed by the need for 
cultural sensitivity and the positive effects on individual (and almost certainly collective) 
welfare that appropriate contact with whanau and iwi may have. 
C. s.66 The Right to Treatment: 
"Every patient is entitled to medical treatment and other health care appropriate to his 
condition."76 The inclusion of this right illustrates that the right of society to be protected 
from mentally disordered persons carries with it a duty to provide appropriate care and 
treatment to those persons. 
73 Atawhaitia - The Maori Trustee Report on the Care of Maori under the Protection of Pers
onal 
and Property Rights Act 1988 and part 4 of the Maori Affairs Act 1953 (Wellington, June 199
1) 
16. 
74 Bell and Brookbanks, fn 32, 9.6. 
75 See fn 71. 
76 Section 66 of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. 
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This right has long been recognised in other jurisdictions, for example, in Wyatt v Stickney 
it was held that "involuntarily committed patients have a constitutional right to receive 
such treatment as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve 
his or her mental condition.". 7
7 Without offering appropriate treatment, holding the 
mentally ill without their consent merely amounts to preventative detention and does not 
adequately recognise their individual rights and needs. This section, therefore, recognises 
that for utilitarianism to be just, certain individual rights must be recognised, thereby 
contributing to the balancing of these two apparently conflicting aims. 
It has been argued that this section of the Act incorporates a de facto "treatability" 
criterion, that is, a person should not be detained under the Act unless she will benefit 
from treatment. If this is so, it would seem to further complicate the situation with regard 
to persons suffering from a personality disorder as it is widely believed that many such 
persons cannot be treated or "cured". This view is in keeping with the Mason report 
which said that "the right to treatment only extends to treatable patients. It does not 
require that those who are not treatable should have treatment forced upon them."
78 The 
report seems to suggest that in order to justifiably detain a person under the Act, he 
should be responsive to treatment, otherwise society is merely detaining him to prevent 
danger to society. 
It is arguable, that in this case, such a person is best left to the criminal justice system 
after his dangerousness has manifested itself: "A compulsory treatment order cannot be 
upheld and continued simply for the purposes of detaining a person who otherwise might 
pose a serious danger to the public."
79 Is this apparent requirement of treatability really 
necessary? 
77 325 F Supp 781, 785. 
78 Mason report, fn 71, 224. 
79 Re RR 9 /7 /93, SRT93. 
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It does in one sense strengthen an individual's position against arbitrary detention, 
however, if a person suffering a personality disorder, for example, exhibits symptoms of a 
disorder of mood or a disorder of cognition/volition and poses a danger to the public and 
himself, it would seem contrary to the intention in the Act that he could not be made 
subject to a CTO. Society, in this case, is not being protected. Furthermore, for the 
individual to be left at large until his dangerousness manifests itself in criminal offending is 
not satisfactory for the individual either. Were he sent to prison, his mental disorder could 
place him at a serious disadvantage, and he may be open to abuse from other inmates. 
There is certainly no easy solution to this problem. To hold on to a mentally disordered 
person indefinitely because he shows no sign of improvement harks back to archaic 
asylums, but there seem to be few other ways to protect society from harm. Perhaps the 
drafters of the current Act chose to draft s.66 because it is the lesser of two evils: in an 
imperfect situation, the provision that maximises individual liberty is to be preferred. 
D. s.67 The Right to be Informed about Treatment: 
Again, this is further evidence that the mentally disordered are not to be viewed as thorns 
in the side of society, but, to the largest extent possible, they should be viewed as 
independent and autonomous beings. This provision should help foster helpful and 
sympathetic relationships between patients and mental health professionals so that even 
if a patient is being compulsorily treated against his will he should be given every 
opportunity to understand why, thereby minimising the incursion into his autonomy, 
whilst not affecting utilitarian goals. 
E. s.68 Further Rights in case of Visual or Audio Recording: 
This section requires that the patient ( or his personal representative) consents before any 
audio or audio-visual recording is made of any treatment or interview of the patient. This, 
again, gives the patient an increased say in what may be done to him while he is being 
detained. 
F. s.69 The Right to Independent Psychiatric Advice: 
The inclusion of this section is another improvement to the previous legislative scheme. It 
enables a patient to get independent advice concerning his treatment. Independent in this 
case means independent of his treatment, it does not require that the psychiatrist be 
independent of the body providing the treatment. It has been suggested that this section 
may help relive a patients anxiety with regard to compulsory treatment, and as such may 
help foster a good relationship with his usual doctor.
80 However, this right may pose 
difficulties in practice as there is no obligation on the treating hospital to provide a second 
opinion. As such, it may be virtually impossible in some situations for a patient to 
arrange an independent psychiatrist, for example if he is subdued by medication, or has no 
family and few contacts. 
The right to consult an independent psychiatrist is valuable because it increases individual 
rights without hampering the utilitarian goals of social protection. 
G. s. 70 The Right to Independent Legal Advice: 
s. 70 requires that a lawyer must be allowed access to his client, but again does not require 
the mental health authorities to provide a lawyer. Even though the Ministry of Health's 
guidelines recommend that arrangements are made with local lawyers to facilitate legal 
representation, this is in no way guaranteed.
81 
80 Bell and Brookbanks, fn 32, 9.9. 
81 Ministry of Health's Guidelines, fn 67, paral9.7, 33. 
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For the rights in ss.69 and 70 to really protect the individual's interests, there should be 
an obligation on the mental health authority to provide an independent psychiatrist and 
legal representation if requested. No less is done for suspects when remanded in custody 
in the criminal justice system, 82 and it is arguable that the mentally disordered person is in 
a far more tenuous situation: he may be confused as a result of his disorder, he may be 
sedated by drugs, and he may be totally under-resourced. Although the rights in this 
section and in s.69 are laudable in intent, there must be an effective way of guaranteeing 
them. Guaranteeing such rights would not jeopardise society's right to protection, and 
would greatly improve the position of the individual. 
H. s.71 The Right to Company and Seclusion: 
The use of seclusion as a therapeutic tool has been limited to situations where the 
responsible clinician agrees that it is in the patient's best interests. 
Because seclusion can be a further violation of liberty, strict guidelines have been laid 
down by the Ministry of Health as to when a patient can be placed in seclusion. 
83 This is 
yet another improvement to the previous Act where no such guidance was available and 
seclusion was more readily used. 
I. s.72 - 74 Right to Communicate: 
These sections help to safeguard the right of the individual to communicate with the 
outside world. Naturally, this will often be beneficial to maintain relationships with 
family and friends and as such may speed recovery. The ability of the responsible 
clinician to withhold mail if he considers it beneficial to the patient has been defined and 
limited, thereby maximising the patient's liberty in this respect, without altering the level 
of protection available to society. 
82 Section 10 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985. 
83 Ministry of Health: Procedural Guidelines for the Use of Seclusion (revised edition) 
(Wellington, 1995). 
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The language of rights used in part VI of the Act creates the impression of a more liberal 
and benevolent piece of legislation. However, these are not the only rights created by the 
Act, as there are other equally important entitlements provided for elsewhere. For 
example, the patient has the right to withdraw his consent, 
84 and he has the right to 
instigate a judicial or clinical review of his treatment. 
85 Significant in the protection of 
individual rights are the additional limits placed on mental health professionals when the 
patient is being given invasive treatment such as ECT or brain-surgery. 
86 Furthermore the 
patient has certain basic rights that are so fundamental that there was no need to protect 
them in legislation, such as the right to food and shelter. As discussed, recognising such 
rights is vital to promoting an individual's sense of self-worth and empowerment. These 
rights are of fundamental significance to the mentally ill, and yet do not adversely affect 
society's right to protection. In this way, a significant step has been made towards 
redressing the imbalance in the previous legislative scheme. 
This paper shall now consider whether these professed rights are mere tokens, or whether 
the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 provides an 
effective framework for their protection. 
VIII. RIGHTS OF REVIEW: 
Despite the apparent focus on individual rights in the 1992 Act, the rights-conferring 
provisions are rendered nugatory if there is no way to assert and enforce them. As 
mentioned above, the 1969 Act provided very little in the way of specific protection for 
84 Section 57, s.63. The issue of consent is discussed below at part VIII. 
85 Section16, s.18, s.76, s.77,s.83, s.84 of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and 
Treatment) Act 1992. 
86 Section 58, s.59, s.60, s.61 of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 
1992. 
mentally disordered people's rights, and indeed, by virtue of s.124, reduced their rights to 
bring actions in tort vis a vis non-mentally disordered persons. The 1992 Act is certainly 
a great improvement on the previous scheme as it recognises that mentally disordered 
persons subject to a CTO need an enhanced method ofreview because of the tenuous 
position they may be in, and the great incursion into their liberty that a CTO will involve. 
The various methods of review shall now be examined. 
A. Clinical Review: 
Under s.76 of the Act, every patient subject to a CTO must undergo clinical review not 
less than three months after the initial order is made, and then at 6 monthly intervals. The 
responsible clinician must consult all persons involved in the patient's treatment to 
determine her condition. A certificate detailing the findings of this review is then sent to 
the Director of Area Mental Health Services. On performing a clinical review, the 
responsible clinician may himself declare that the patient is fit to be released from 
compulsory status, and thereby revoke the CT0.
87 
This is an important provision, because it is fundamental to the operation of the Act that 
a person should not be detained if he is not mentally disordered under s.2 of the Act. 
However, there is very little guidance in the Act as to when a patient is "fit to be 
released". It is merely said that a patient is fit to be released from a CTO when he is "no 
longer mentally disordered and fit to be released from the requirement of assessment or 
treatment under [the] Act." It has been argued that this section is flawed because the 
argument is circular: compulsory status can only apply to someone who is mentally 
disordered and requires assessment or treatment.
88 However, the circularity is not 
87 Section 76(3)-(5). 
88 Bell and Brookbanks, fn 32, 8.6. 
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problematic in and of itself, it is simply that if the definition in s.2 does not apply (that 
is, the patient does not exhibit any of the observable symptoms listed in the first limb, 
and or is no longer "dangerous" as required by the second limb) he is no longer mentally 
disturbed. Thus the only difficulties with the definition of "fit to be discharged" will be 
the same as those listed in relation to s.2.
89 
B. Reviews by the Mental Health Review Tribunal: 
The tribunals have jurisdiction over persons subject to Compulsory Treatment Orders 
and may act on receipt of a certificate of clinical review
90 or of its own motion. 91 In this 
way, the tribunal may be seen as a supervising body. Whilst the tribunal does not have 
jurisdiction to declare that the patient has been illegally detained, it does have the power 
to order the revocation of a CTO. The tribunal can only take into account the criteria for 
discharge determined by the Act
92 and cannot take into account other factors external to 
the patient's condition. Whilst this may, in some circumstances, mean that patients who 
would otherwise benefit from treatment are released and thus may pose a potential 
increased risk to society, it is to be welcomed that the tribunals apply the letter of the 
statute so rigidly. The writer suggests that it is preferable to have a patient released from 
compulsory status, and then, if necessary, readmitted, than it is to continue to detain such 
a person "just in case". Furthermore, for a tribunal to deem a patient fit to be released, he 
must no longer satisfy the criteria of s.2, in which case, he should not pose a danger to 
himself or society at all. In this way, the tribunal performs a highly important 
supervisory role, ensuring that the responsible clinician has properly applied the relevant 
legal test, and in this way, ensures that the autonomy of the individual is not 
overshadowed by the desire to protect society form perceived antisocial behaviour. 
89 See above, part V of this paper. 
90 Section 76. 
91 Section79. 
92 Under s.2 of the Act. 
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The tribunal has broader powers of review, however, when there is an alleged breach of a 
patient's rights under Part VI of the Act.
93 Under s. 75(4), the tribunal may "take all steps 
as may be necessary to rectify the matter". This section means that the rights conferred 
by Part VI of the Act may be adequately protected: a protection which mental health 
patients have never enjoyed before in New Zealand. However, as mentioned above, there 
are a great many other rights that are not specifically included in part VI or are deemed so 
fundamental that they are not included in the Act at all. With regard to these rights, the 
tribunal has no jurisdiction to intervene and cure perceived injustices, and may not 
intervene to say that a particular course of treatment should not be followed. This limits 
the tribunal's power ofreview, and prevents the tribunal from giving effect to all rights 
under the Act. It could be said that a wider power of review would enable the tribunal to 
better protect the individual against violations of his rights. 
There is, though, an uneasy tension between psychiatrists and lawyers, and it could be 
said that each should observe their own fields of expertise: that is, the psychiatrists 
should be allowed to make appropriate diagnoses free from the interference of the tribunal 
(so long as there is sufficient provision for the patient to obtain a second opinion), while 
the tribunal's most appropriate role is to see that the correct legal procedures have been 
complied with.94 In this way, not only is society being protected by patients being given 
appropriate treatment ( as determined by those in the best position to evaluate the 
patient's condition) and the individual is being protected to some extent because the 
tribunal is enforcing procedural fairness. It is suggested, though, that the tribunal's 
93 See part VI of this paper. 
94 Dr AIF Simpson: "Making the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 
work" [1996]MHL 51. 
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effectiveness could be extended by allowing it to review a violation of any right of the 
patient, not including an investigation of appropriate treatment. 
C. Judicial Review: 
One of the first reviews a patient may be subject to is under s.16. This may occur in the 
first period of assessment and treatment
95 if requested by the patient. 
96 An application is 
made to the District Court which enables the judge to release the patient from 
compulsory status if he deems that the patient is no longer mentally disordered within the 
terms of s.2. This section does not give the judge the power to determine the legality of 
the patient's detention, but it is an important layer of protection for individuals detained 
pursuant to the Act, nonetheless. In the first period of detention, the patient need not 
have yet been examined by a psychiatric specialist, and thus it is vital that there be some 
method of challenge to enable the patient to gain release if he is not actually mentally 
disordered. 
Another important restriction on the invasive powers of the Act is s.18. This provides 
that a judge must examine a patient if an application for a CTO has been made before such 
an order is made.97 The judge must consult the responsible clinician and at least one other 
health professional involved in the treatment of the patient, and if the judge is satisfied 
that the patient is no longer mentally disordered, he can order the patient's immediate 
95 Under s.11, if the examining medical practitioner believes that the patient is mentally 
disordered he can be held for five days. This is the first period of assessment and treatment. 
96 Or any of the other persons listed in s.10(4)(a). The Judge cannot initiate an inquiry of his own 
motion. 
97 Section 14(4)(a). 
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release. Again, this step is a vital limitation to the powers of the Act, and demonstrates 
the vast improvement of the statutory regime. There is here an appropriate emphasis on 
the need to be absolutely sure before depriving a person of his liberty. In this way, 
society may also be protected: responsible clinicians may make preliminary assessments 
of people without subjecting them to the full force of a CTO and may be assured that the 
final decision to commit is not one they will have to take alone. 
Even though the tribunals do provide a useful safeguard for individuals who are subject to 
a CTO, appeals of tribunal decisions to the district court are possible under s.83. The 
only purpose of this review is to determine whether a patient is fit to be released. This 
section may be problematic, as there is the possibility that a cycle of appeals may be 
started as neither the tribunal or the district court can bind the other with precedent. This 
has the unfortunate result that the legal status of the patient may remain unresolved and 
uncertain. It has been suggested by some writers that s.83 should be repealed and replaced 
by a right of appeal to the High Court.
98 The writer would agree with this: certainty in 
mental health law often proves evasive, but should be strived for because of the 
fundamental values at stake. For uncertainty to be created by a procedural system is not 
desirable, and thus a structure allowing an appeal to the High Court is to be preferred. 
The most extensive power of review under the Act is contained in s.84. The judge may 
require that a report is written about a patient "as the Judge thinks fit" .
99 This section is 
commonly invoked, and provides a final level of protection for those compulsorily 
detained under the Act. It is a marked improvement in contrast to the 1969 Act that those 
98 See for example, Bell and Brookbanks, fn 32, 8.5.3. 
99 Section 84(1). 
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who feel they are being wrongly detained should have a set procedure to assert their rights 
rather than being hampered every step of the way by restrictive provisions such as s.124 
ofthe1969 Act. 
It can be seen that there are very important procedural safeguards in place for protecting 
the rights laid down in the Act, and whilst there maybe minor flaws in the review system, 
it is vital to protect individual rights from being overshadowed by societal desires for 
protection from perceived threats. In this way, the procedures for clinical, tribunal and 
judicial review under the Act help achieve a sensible balance between utilitarianism and 
individual rights by giving the individual a way to enforce his rights despite his relatively 
powerless position. 
D. The Mental Health Commission: 
Although it is not mentioned in the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and 
Treatment) Act 1992, the role of the Mental Health Commission is worth considering 
here. The Commission exercises a very wide and general supervisory role, across the 
whole mental health system, and thereby offers yet another level of support for 
individual rights. The Commission was founded as a result of the Mason Report which 
found that mental health services were being provided inconsistently across the country 
and at times were inhumane, and that there was a pressing need for leadership in the 
provision of mental health services.
100 The functions of the Commission include, 
providing advice to the Minister of Health, monitoring the provision of mental health 
services, and ensuring metal health needs are being met, and reducing the stigma and 
discrimination surrounding mental disorder.
101 
100 Mason Report, fn 71 . 
101 See Sylvia Bell: "The Mental Health Commission" [1996] MHL 71. 
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Although the Commission is only a temporary statutory body, it has a potentially very 
useful role within mental health services. By investigating and reporting on the rights of 
individual patients, the Commission will make mental health services more transparent 
which in effect will make them more just.
102 
In reporting on the injustices and inadequacies of the mental health system, the 
Commission could be in a position to help strike the appropriate balance between 
utilitarianism and individual rights: to ensure that society is properly protected whilst 
enabling individuals to operate as autonomous beings to the maximum possible extent. 
IX. SHOULD THERE BE A PRESUMPTION OF COMPETENCY? 
This paper has illustrated many of the reforms of mental health legislation which have 
promoted the rights of the individual to try to redress the inequality of the system so that 
the mentally ill have well established and protected rights to freedom from arbitrary 
detention, a right to human dignity and adequate rights of review. Some commentators, 
however, suggest that merely using the language of rights and putting judicial safeguards in 
place still does not place sufficient weight on individual rights, and continues to value 
social utility too highly. What is needed, they assert, is a presumption of competency.
103 
Even though a person is compulsorily detained under the Act, he has not necessarily 
lost his capacity to consent to treatment. Indeed, the Act states that as a basic principle, 
no-one should be treated without his consent.
104 This right is qualified in that non-
consensual treatment is permitted for the period of assessment and for the first month of 
102 See for example, Mental Health Commission: Specialist Mental Health Services For 
Children and Youth (Wellington, May 1999). 
io3See Denys Court: "Mental Disorder and Human Rights: the Importance of a Presumption of 
Competence." [1996] Auckland University Law Review 1. 
104 Section 57. 
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a CT0. 105 Additionally, if after the first month of treatment, the patient still refuses to 
consent, and the responsible clinician considers it in the patient's best interests to 
continue treatment, a second opinion will be obtained from a psychiatrist appointed by 
the Mental Health 
Review Tribunal. 106 Thus in theory, the patient's consent should be obtained for 
treatment to continue (unless a second opinion is obtained under the Act). However, the 
provisions in the Act do not amount to a presumption of competency to consent of the 
sort defined in the American case of Rogers v Okin where it was held that even though he 
is committed, a mental patient is to be presumed competent to consent to treatment in 
non-emergencies. 107 
It is argued that presuming a person competent has many important advantages, for 
example maintaining his self-esteem, 
108 encouraging independence and useful functioning 
in society. However, it appears that there is almost a presumption of incompetence in 
New Zealand, which is not necessarily in line with the apparent desire in the Mental 
Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 to make compulsory 
detention and treatment as uninvasive as possible and to maximise individual autonomy 
and wellbeing. In the case of Re KS, for example, a patient objected to being given ECT 
and applied for judicial enquiry under s.84 Act. The responsible clinician decided that it 
was in the patient's best interests under s.60 Act to have ECT and obtained a concurring 
opinion from a second psychiatrist under s.60(b ). The court refused to exercise its 
powers under s.84 just because the patient objected.
109 Brookbank:s has noted that: 
105 Section 59. 
106 Section 59(2)(b ). 
107 (1979) 478 F Supp 1342, 1367. 
108 This stems from the concept of "normalization", that it is of the utmost importance that the 
mentally ill be treated, as far as possible, in the same way as every other person. See D Court, 
fn 103, 6. 
109 [1993] NZFLR 845; (1993) 11 FRNZ 15. (cited by D.Court, fn 103, 14). 
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"[T]he decision appears to represent at some level a return to the presumption of 
'global incompetence' in that it appears to imply that if a patient has been detained 
for treatment then any treatment that may seem to clinicians to be desirable may 
be administered irrespective of the wishes of the patient or his family ... [D]oes 
the decision mean that a refusal of consent even by a competent patient is 
ineffectual where the clinical decision to treat has been taken?" 1
10 
If the decision in Re Ks is taken to give clinicians carte blanche to administer any 
treatment to compulsorily detained persons under the Act, so long as they obtain a 
second opinion, it is a disturbing trend. Whilst it may be in society's interest that a person 
be treated and, if possible, "cured" of his antisocial disorder, it is also in society's interest 
that when that person is returned to society, he is a functioning, independent human being 
with a sense of self-worth. Presuming him incompetent is likely to achieve the opposite -
he may begin to actually believe he is incompetent, and it is likely that compulsory 
treatment, especially of a highly invasive nature like ECT, is likely to render the patient 
extremely bitter. Additionally, it is arguable that a patient should have the right to 
withhold his consent from such invasive treatment. This, therefore, does not achieve the 
ends of either society or the individual. It is suggested, then, that a patient's right to refuse 
treatment under s.11 Bill of Rights Act 1990 should not be side-stepped just because 
s.60(b) 1992 Act. 
110 Brookbanks: "Electro-Convulsive Therapy and the Mental Health (Compulsory assessment 
and Treatment) Act 1992 (NZ)" (1994) 1 Journal Law and Medicine 184, 190. 
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X. HAS THE RIGHTS FOCUS OVERSHADOWED OTHER ISSUES? 
The Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 has improved the 
relationship between the mental health system and mentally disordered persons at many 
junctures. It has been suggested in this paper that the Act constitutes a huge step forward 
towards a more enlightened mental health system with greater regard for individual 
autonomy and liberty and with adequate procedures to protect individual rights. It is now 
necessary to examine the operation of this rights-based approach in practice, to determine 
whether the Act has really helped mentally disordered persons, and additionally whether 
the Act has left society unreasonably exposed to the mentally disordered. That is, has the 
language of rights lulled proponents of individual rights into a false sense of security, 
and/or has the rights focus ignored the utilitarian goal of social protection. 
The rights approach of the Act is in keeping with the trend originating in the 1960's which 
recognised the inappropriate and ineffective nature of compulsory hospitalisation for 
many mentally disordered persons and shifted the emphasis towards care of the mentally 
ill in the community. 111 This trend is reflected in the 1992 Act which contains a 
presumption that mentally disordered persons will be subject to the least invasive form of 
compulsory treatment, namely compulsory community care, rather than in-patient 
treatment. 112 When making a compulsory treatment order, the court has a discretion as to 
what type of order to make, but may only make a community treatment order if: 
(a) The Board provides, through the institution or service named in the order, care and 
treatment on an outpatient basis that is appropriate to the needs of the patient; and 
(b) The social circumstances of the patient are adequate for his or her care within the 
community. 113 
111 p Barham: Closing the Asylum: The Mental Patient in Modern Society" (Penguin, London, 
1992). 
112 Section 28(2). 
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The original policy of community care was intended to enable the closing of expensive, 
inefficient institutions, with the result that the money released could be channelled back 
into community services to better support the former patients of those institutions in a 
more appropriate manner. 114 
The end result, though has not been as successful as anticipated. The cost of running 
community services was severely underestimated, and the effect was that the lack of 
funding and resources left community services unable to care for many former patients 
who could not then be returned to their former hospitals because they had been 
downsized or shut-down altogether. For these people there was nothing to "afford them 
asylum .. in the most benevolent sense."
115 For these people, their position is an 
uncomfortable one -- they have been released from compulsory in-patient care, without 
appropriate support structures in place. As a result, their functioning in the community 
must necessarily be impaired. This is of great concern to both proponents of individual 
rights and those wary of letting the mentally disordered "loose" in society because of the 
potential harm to the community they exist in. The individual is severely disadvantaged: 
not only is he subject to a compulsory treatment order which can require him to live in a 
certain place and to accept certain medication, but society is not acting with any degree of 
reciprocity. He is not being given the support and treatment that he requires to help him 
function in the community, and arguably, this is failing to take seriously the obligations to 
provide "medical treatment and other health care appropriate to his condition" .
116 The 
community is also at risk, because without sufficient support for mentally disordered 
113 Section 28(4). 
114 Bell and Brookbanks, fn 32, 183. 
115 Bell and Brookbanks, fn 32, 183. 
116 Section 66. 
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persons living under compulsory treatment orders in the community, there is no guarantee 
that the patient will continue to take medication etc so as to reduce his risk to society. 
Clearly, without sufficient funding, the provisions in s.28 could harm both patients and 
the community. 
There was originally a provision in the Mental Health Bill (which established the Mental 
Health Commission) to make the Commission responsible for purchasing mental health 
services. This would have enabled the Commission to channel all funding from former 
institutions back into community services. Unfortunately, this never materialised, and the 
Commission is now only able to monitor and evaluate, and is unable to act if money is 
being siphoned away from community services. 
There have, however, been suspicions that the Community Treatment Order, despite 
being shrouded in the language of rights, may be used as an instrument of social control. If 
it is seen as a "soft-option", a way of dealing with mentally ill people who may cause 
social problems but are not felt to be dangerous enough to warrant compulsory detention 
in hospital, a system akin to plea bargaining may take place whereby mentally disordered 
persons may be subject to surveillance and control in the community .
117 This would be of 
great concern as community treatment orders may be almost as invasive as compulsory 
detention in hospital. Monitoring would have to take place by way of compulsory blood 
testing to see whether medication is being taken, and limits on lifestyle might be imposed 
such as whether the patient was allowed to drink, or whether he was allowed to meet 
certain people. 118 Such requirements impose huge restrictions on the lifestyle of the 
patient, yet the community has an easy conscience knowing that he is subject to a less 
restrictive type of treatment. 
117 Dawson: "Community Treatment Orders" [1991] Otago Law Review 410, 413. 
118 Dawson, fn 117,413. 
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The criteria listed in s.28( 4) may provide a significant hurdle to the making of community 
treatment orders. As mentioned above, the lack of funding to community mental health 
services may mean that there are simply not the resources to place people in the 
community, so that they must remain in hospital. This does not reflect the liberal 
intentions in the Act which purports to reduce the incursion into the liberty of 
individuals. Indeed, it is possible that patients who might benefit from community care, 
but who are not of such danger to themselves that they must remain in hospital (for 
example, they have agreed to take their medication which suppresses their symptoms, but 
require occasional supervision to ensure their continued compliance). It could be argued 
that this is an unnecessary restriction on the liberty of the individual. 
It would appear that the proper functioning of the Act is largely dependant on political 
will. The 1992 Act does not determine how mental health services are to be funded, and 
there is nothing to require funds from "deinstitutionalisation" to be re-routed to patients 
in the community .119 If this funding was in fact happening, judges would be able to give 
community treatment orders more often, and be sure that the patients really were 
obtaining the most appropriate care in the least invasive of settings. The writer suggests 
that the Mental Health Commission is in the perfect position to be able to monitor and 
set funding for mental health services, and regrets that the Commission was not given a 
role in the purchasing of mental health services. The care of the mentally ill should not be 
subject to political whim diverting funds to other "good causes". A major effect of the 
1992 Act was to engage public and political attention, to focus action on the rights of 
patients. There is no telling how long the spotlight will remain on the rights of the 
mentally ill, and when political attentions turn back to other unrelated policies, there are 
no guarantees that funding will be forthcoming. 
119 See Dawson, fn 117. 
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Thus, it can be seen that the rights focus does not necessarily guarantee less invasive 
treatment. When the least invasive order, the community treatment order, could 
potentially be used as a form of social control, it is clear that the language of rights does 
not go far enough to countering the inadequacies of the system. Furthermore, that a less 
invasive form of treatment is unavailable because of a lack of funding is also unacceptable, 
and illustrates how the language of rights can appease the political and public conscience. 
Indeed, the writer would even suggest that using the language of rights alone, can often 
mask the deficiencies of a legislative system and lull those in power into a false belief that 
those at the receiving end are properly provided for. As Spencer Zifcak notes: "[p]olitical 
claims cloaked in the language of rights, may achieve short term success in shifting 
governmental priorities in favour of additional provision for people with mental illness. 
In the longer term, however, the fate of the mentally ill .... will ultimately depend upon 
the outcome of broader social arguments and conflicts." 
Complacency towards the Act would be harmful; those receiving mental health services 
should not be content that they now have rights unless and until those rights are actually 
recognised and protected. The role of the Mental Health Commission could be crucial in 
this respect in focusing public and political attention towards the real deficiencies in the 
mental health system beneath the veneer of rights and entitlements. That role could be 
magnified, however, if the Commission were given responsibility for funding allocation. In 
this way, the Committee could be certain of political attention. 
XI. CONCLUSION: 
This paper has illustrated some of the many improvements introduced to mental health 
law by the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, and 
concludes that the less restrictive, rights-oriented approach is one to be welcomed. 
51 
The previous systemic imbalance has been significantly altered by this Act: the mentally 
ill are no longer individuals pitted against the system with no form of defence when 
compulsorily deprived ofliberty and autonomy. Now, the mentally ill have a whole 
bastion of rights and have avenues for clinical and judicial protection to pursue that 
prevents the system removing their liberty arbitrarily. However, too much emphasis on 
the improvements in the Act, detracts from the failings of the legislation itself, and the 
mental health system as a whole. In order to gain a satisfactory balance between the 
competing demands of individual rights and social utility, an effort must be made to 
counteract the flaws in the system. For example, the definition sections of the Act, the 
bedrock of the whole piece of legislation and the yardstick against which people will be 
measured before being deprived of their liberty and autonomy, are unsatisfactorily vague. 
Greater certainty must be introduced so that decisions are not made arbitrarily, otherwise 
the scale will slip back towards ensuring social protection at the expense of the individual 
where not fully justified. 
The emphasis on rights and least invasive methods of treatment in the Act also help to 
change public perceptions away from visions of the mentally ill as crazed "lunatics", 
towards a more sensitive view. However, the Act appears to give with one hand and take 
away with the other. It is at once trying to harmonise mental health services, but at the 
same time is setting the criteria for compulsory treatment at "dangerousness". This label 
is not helpful and appears to undo much of the good that the Act achieves. If a balance 
between utilitarianism and individual rights is to be achieved, society should feel that it is 
being adequately protected, otherwise it may call for harsher standards and cause the 
recent liberal changes to be undone. The "dangerousn~ss" criteria seems at variance with 
the Act's purpose and should be replaced. 
120 
120 See the suggested definition in part V.C of this paper. 
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Furthermore, the mood of enlightenment surrounding the recent legislative changes may be 
hiding some fundamental problems which may put hurdles in the way of achieving a 
proper balance between the rights of the mentally disordered person and the expectations 
of the public at large. It must be realised that while the Act represents a massive step 
forwards, it does not cure all ills. There are basic and difficult issues such as funding and 
resource allocation to resolve before the Act can ever properly function as it was designed 
to. 
Until these questions and issues are resolved, there is still the risk that the mentally 
disordered will be dealt with in an ad hoe manner -- as dependant on social mood and 
funding allocation as the existence of a mental disorder in the patient. It is the conclusion 
of this paper that uncertainty in this area is potentially hazardous. Questions of 
individual liberty and social protection are far too important to be left to chance. 
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